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O
ver the course of the highly contested 2004 
presidential elections in Ukraine, two graduate 
students from Columbia University served as 
International Election Observers. Rory Finnin, 
doctoral student in the Department of Slavic Languages 
and the Center for Comparative Literature and Society, 
and Adriana Helbig, PhD candidate in the Department 
of Music, were members of delegations fielded by the 
Ukrainian Congressional Committee of America 
(UCCA), a U.S.-based non-governmental organization 
founded in 1940 and registered with the Central 
Election Commission of Ukraine. Rory served in the 
Cherkasy oblast in central Ukraine during the first round 
of the elections on October 31, 2004, and Adriana 
served in the Transcarpathian oblast in western Ukraine 
during both the first round on October 31 and the 
second round on November 21, 2004.
This article is comprised of two sections, organized 
by electoral round and region. Based on Rory's 
observations, the first section addresses the October 31 
poll in Cherkasy, briefly reviewing the electoral 
significance of the oblast before elaborating upon the 
corrupted voter registries and the state's use of “soft” 
intimidation that undermined the voting process there. 
The second section, based on Adriana's observations, 
deals with the November 21 poll in Transcarpathia; the 
account is prefaced with a discussion of the political 
machinations in Uzhhorod prior to the elections
between the pro-government Sotsial-demokratychna
Partiia Ukrainy-obiednana (Social Democratic Party of 
Ukraine-united; SDPU-o) and the opposition party, 
Nasha Ukraina (Our Ukraine). It then proceeds to 
describe many of the ways in which local officials 
intimidated voters and manipulated marginalized 
constituencies in a campaign of falsification and fraud.
First Round: Cherkasy Oblast
As crowds in the hundreds of thousands swelled
Kyiv's Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) to 
protest widespread electoral fraud following the 
November 21 run-off between Viktor Yushchenko and 
Viktor Yanukovych, journalists in Europe and the 
United States tended to cast the dramatic events of the 
Orange Revolution in binary terms, as the outcome of a 
conflict not only between a “pro-Western reformer” and 
a “Kremlin-backed prime minister,” but also between 
“western” and “eastern” Ukraine. “Ukraine's East and 
West Are Miles Apart on the Issues,” declared one 
headline on the front page of the Los Angeles Times,1 
while television commentators in the United States 
depicted the crisis as a confrontation between a “Red 
State vs. Blue State” Ukraine.2 This regional cleavage, 
while qualified by some, was frequently depicted in the 
popular media with Manichean simplicity, offering 
journalists a convenient analogue to the international 
power play putatively taking place between Moscow, on 
one hand, and Washington and Brussels, on the other, 
over the election row.3
Of course, the thesis of “two Ukraines” is nothing 
new. In 1992, the Ukrainian intellectual Mykola 
Riabchuk introduced the concept per se in an article 
entitled “Two Ukraines?” in the East European
1. Kim Murphy, “Ukraine's East and West Are Miles Away 
on the Issues,” Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2004, front 
page.
2. See Michael McFaul's conversation with Jim Lehrer of the 
PBS NewsHour on November 23, 2004, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july- 
dec04/ukraine_11-23.html.
3. See, for example, Fred Weir and Howard Lafranchi, “The 
East-West Stakes over Ukraine,” Christian Science Monitor, 
November 25-26, 2004, front page.
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Reporter4; in 2002 he sought to update and clarify it in 
an article entitled “One State: Two Countries?” in 
Transit.5 Nor is it necessarily misleading. Differing 
historical, linguistic, and cultural circumstances have 
produced something of a political divergence that can be 
drawn along a geographical imaginary in Ukraine, and it 
is one that Yushchenko himself effectively 
acknowledged in a campaign slogan, “Donets'k + L'viv 
= Peremoha” (Donets'k + L'viv = Victory).6 It is rather 
when the concept of “two Ukraines” participates in 
essentializing these differences, casting them as 
irrevocably black and white and devoid of shades of 
gray, that it becomes not only grossly simplistic but also 
dangerous fodder for political manipulation.7
Orest Subtelny, among others, has argued for an 
evaluation of Ukraine's political geography in terms of 
“a three-part rather than a two-part scheme,” which 
identifies three basic regions that, notably, may be 
broken down further:
western Ukraine; central Ukraine, 
encompassing what was traditionally called 
Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine, with Kyiv at its 
center; and the southeast, which includes such 
areas as the Donbas, the Crimea, and the 
Odessa regions. In this scheme, the west and 
the southeast represent the two extremes of the 
national consciousness spectrum, while the 
center occupies an intermediate position.8
Central Ukraine's intermediacy, Subtelny points out, 
stems from the fact that it did not experience the degree 
of “ethnic confrontation” that historically beleaguered 
western Ukraine, nor was it subject to the degree of
4. Mykola Riabchuk, “Two Ukraines?” East European
Reporter 5:4 (July-August 1992).
5. Mykola Riabchuk, “One State, Two Countries?” Transit-
Europaeische Revue 23 (2002).
6. Bez Tsenzury: Hromads'ko-Politychnyi tyzhnevyk 34
(October 31-November 6, 2003), 1; quoted in Yaroslav
Hytsak, “On the Relevance and Irrelevance of Nationalism in 
Ukraine” (paper presented at the Second Annual Cambridge- 
Stasiuk Lecture on Ukraine, University of Alberta, February 
20, 2004), http:// www.ualberta.ca/~cius/stasiuk/st-
articles/2004-02-20_Cambridge%20Lecture%202004.pdf, 8.
7. In this regard, we need only look to the events in 
Severodonets'k on November 28, 2004, when 3,500 pro- 
Yanukovych officials from seventeen eastern regions 
mobilized the rhetoric of regionalism and threatened secession 
and Ukraine's territorial integrity.
8. Orest Subtelny, “Introduction” in Sharon L. Wolchik and
Volodymyr Zviglyanich (eds.), Ukraine: The Search for a
National Identity (New York and Oxford: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2000), 5. As we shall see in the second section of
this article, western Ukraine is a very complicated tableau 
itself. One would be mistaken to equate the level of “national 
consciousness” in Uzhhorod with that of L'viv, for example.
“ethnic homogenization” that took place in southeastern 
Ukraine.9 As a result, the region has tended to mediate 
the “national extremism of the west” and the “national 
nihilism of the southeast,” acting as a glue, as it were, 
that keeps Ukraine together.10
This accommodation of differing political 
viewpoints has been especially evident in presidential 
election years. In the run-off between Leonid Kuchma 
and Leonid Kravchuk in 1994, for example, the most 
highly contested oblasts were Cherkasy and Kirovohrad, 
where Kuchma garnered 45.7% (compared to 
Kravchuk's 50.8%) and 49.7% (to Kravchuk's 45.7%) 
of the vote, respectively. In 1999, when the Kyiv oblast 
and the city of Kyiv cast their lots with Kuchma over 
the Communist Petro Symonenko, the Cherkasy oblast 
joined those of Luhans'k, Kherson, and Crimea, among 
others, in supporting the latter candidate. This potential 
to “swing” made central Ukraine a linchpin in the 2004 
presidential elections, “the region that will most likely 
decide [their] outcome,”11 and its importance meant that 
it was never far from the threat of electoral foul play.
When our team of six observers arrived in the city of 
Cherkasy on October 30, the day before the first-round 
contest, we met with Maksym Mykhlyk, head of the
local branch of the independent nongovernmental
organization Komitet Vyboriv Ukrainy (Committee of 
Voters of Ukraine; CVU), to gauge the pre-election 
atmosphere in the Cherkasy oblast and identify the 
polling stations that were feared particularly susceptible 
to falsification and fraud.12 Only the day before, the
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 6.
11. Taras Kuzio, “Front Runners Battle It Out in Ukraine's 
Last Presidential Polls,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, October 22, 
2004.
12. An independent NGO active throughout Ukraine, the CVU 
also organized approximately 10,000 domestic observers for 
the first round. The polling stations on our itinerary were 
often full of domestic observers, as most of the 24 candidates 
for president had their own corps of them. A place for chairs, 
resembling a jury box, was usually cordoned off inside the 
voting premises to accommodate them, and most sat there 
throughout the day, content to “observe” from a distance. 
Observers from the CVU and Our Ukraine were exceptional in 
this regard, however; they tended to move about the polling 
stations, anticipating potential problems, and were very eager 
to work with us. Observers from the Yanukovych camp, 
meanwhile, were eager to photograph us, and to our 
amusement, one woman in Korsun'-Shevchenkivs'kyi, wearing 
black sunglasses, went to great lengths to do so while hiding 
behind voters and members of the election commission. Two 
days earlier in Kyiv, rather less amusingly, two thugs accosted 
me for taking a photo of a Yanukovych campaign truck. 
Taking campaign- or election-related photos is the right of all 
observers upon their registration with the Central Election 
Commission, but even after seeing my credentials, they did 
not relent in fighting, ultimately unsuccessfully, for the film in
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CVU had released a report alleging a number of recent 
incidents of violent intimidation of political activists in 
Cherkasy, which included the poisoning of animals on 
the farm of a leader of a “pro-Yushchenko civic group” 
on October 5 and the destruction of a Socialist Party 
print shop on October 10.13 These acts portended the 
possibility of active voter intimidation in 
Cherkashchyna on Election Day. The CVU also 
informed us of its concern about the integrity of ballot 
papers and voter registries, and we compiled a list of 
polling stations in the oblast considered at risk to these 
problems, mapping out an itinerary for the next day.
Our team split into three mobile groups of two on 
Election Day, and I worked with Stefan Petelycky, an 
Auschwitz survivor, representing the Ukrainian 
Canadian Congress,14 throughout territorial election 
district 199, a predominantly rural consistency of 
approximately 140,000 voters and 177 polling 
stations.15 Together we visited two polling stations in 
the town of Horodyshche, eight in the town of Korsun'- 
Shevchenkivs'kyi, and two in the district of Lysianka. 
We were permitted entry at every stage, and the 
chairpersons of the polling station election commissions 
were, by and large, friendly and cooperative. Similarly, 
the members of the election commissions who checked 
voter identification, distributed the ballots, and counted 
the votes were, on the whole, diligent and well-trained. 
Of course, as in any country, conditions were far from 
perfect—the voting premises in polling station #2 in 
Horodyshche, for example, failed to meet size 
specifications, and the subsequent overcrowding 
undermined the secrecy of the voting process there—but 
upon being informed of our observations, the election 
commissions tended to act quickly and professionally to 
remediate any problems.
With twenty-four candidates vying for the 
presidency in the first round, the election ballot 
consisted of a long sheet of paper consisting of a control
my camera. Adorned with Yanukovych's likeness, the
campaign truck bore the slogan “Hadiia - dobre, nadiinist' -
krashche” (Hope is good; certainty is better).
13. Committee of Voters of Ukraine, “Report on the Pre-
Election Environment for October 4-15, 2004,” CVU Events 
Chronicle, October 29, 2004,
http://www.cvu.org.ua/?menu=chronicles&po=
doc&lang=eng&date _end=2004-07-14&date_beg=2005-01- 
10&id=646. These acts of violence in the Cherkasy oblast 
would culminate in the second round in the murder of police 
captain Petro Potiekhin, who was guarding ballot papers in the 
village of Molodets'k in election district 202, which abuts 
district 199.
14. Mr. Petelycky has recounted his ordeal in Auschwitz in his 
autobiography, Into Auschwitz, For Ukraine (Kingston, 
Ontario: Kashtan Press, 1999).
15. The chairperson of territorial election district 199 was
Tamara Mosenko, a supporter of Victor Yanukovych.
coupon, which contained the numbers of the territorial 
election district and the polling station, and the body of 
the ballot itself, which listed the surnames, names, and 
patronymics of the candidates next to brief summaries 
of their respective platforms. By law, each voter is to 
receive one ballot upon presentation of valid 
identification, and its receipt is confirmed by the voter's 
signature on the control coupon, which is then separated 
from the body of the ballot and kept for the record 
before the vote is cast in anonymity. When issuing a 
ballot, the member of the election commission must 
sign both the control coupon and the body of the ballot; 
otherwise, it is nediisnyi (invalid). In polling station #2 
in Horodyshche, we observed one member of the 
election commission repeatedly fail to append her 
signature to the ballots that she distributed, in effect 
invalidating votes before they were cast. Upon our 
deposit of an akt pro porushennia (violation report 
form), this individual was apparently relieved of her 
post, although we cannot confirm that she did not return 
to it later in the day.
The problem that pervaded every polling station on 
our itinerary was not within the primary purview of the 
polling station election commissions, however. 
Incomplete and often woefully inaccurate voter 
registries were commonplace, and their assembly was 
the responsibility of the Central Election Commission 
and the executive bodies of local municipalities. We 
observed scores of prospective voters in electoral 
precinct 199 being turned away from polling stations 
and instructed to go to the local court in order to submit 
a complaint (in accordance with Article 34, part 3 of the 
law, “On Elections of the President of Ukraine”) and 
petition for their immediate inclusion in the relevant 
voter registry. Only with a positive decision from the 
court could they return to the polling station and cast 
their vote. Many of the voters affected by this problem 
informed us that they were lifelong residents of their 
towns or villages and had even voted in the same 
polling station in the 1994 and 1999 presidential 
elections. The perception of injustice among the 
disenfranchised was often so acute that some adamantly 
refused to go to the local court, accusing the polling 
station election commissions of misdeeds and insisting 
that that the matter be resolved then and there. In fact, 
two residents of Korsun'-Shevchenkivs'kyi nearly came 
to blows with members of the election commission in 
polling station #43 over their exclusion from the voter 
registry, and it was only upon the intervention of a 
police officer that they reluctantly acquiesced and 
departed for the local court.16
16. A more than 10% increase in eligible voters in polling 
station #43 between the first round on October 31 (1,730) and 
the repeat run-off on December 26 (1,908) testifies to the 
extent of the voter registry debacle.
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The majority of these disenfranchised voters 
appeared middle-aged, and a number of them told us 
that their demographic had been deliberately targeted 
for its pro-Yushchenko sympathies. They suspected 
that old-age pensioners, who by contrast were inclined 
to vote for Yanukovych, had not been as widely omitted 
from the voter registries.17 (Irrespective of the 
legitimacy of this claim, we did observe that a number 
of pensioners were indeed turned away from polling 
stations in electoral precinct 199, and we met one 
elderly woman in Korsun'-Shevchenkivs'kyi who, like 
many others, had to walk over a kilometer to the local 
court and back again.) Word quickly spread of long 
lines at the local courts, and some of the residents 
excluded from the voter registries seemed to leave the 
polling stations frustrated and discouraged upon hearing 
this news. It was impossible for us to know whether 
they went to appeal their exclusion or simply returned 
home in resignation.
Rumors ran rampant on Election Day, and the 
grapevine worked to the advantage of the state and its 
party of power. In Lysianka, a district with a population 
of approximately 28,000, we observed an armed 
contingent of what appeared to be Berkuty (Golden 
Eagles), an elite police force under the command of the 
Ministry of the Interior, disembark from two buses near 
the center of town. They did not approach a polling 
station or physically intimidate voters, but rather 
congregated outside the buses for a half an hour. What 
the Berkuty were doing in Lysianka on a Sunday 
afternoon remains a mystery—indeed, the mayor of 
Lysianka, a member of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine 
party, had not been informed in advance of their 
arrival—but their presence alone was enough to frighten 
voters and contribute to an already tense atmosphere. 
Similar visits reportedly occurred throughout central 
Ukraine on October 31, evidently part of a larger 
program of what might be called “soft” intimidation, 
whereby the state conspicuously wields its stick, as it 
were, without using it.
The arrival of the Berkuty proved a distraction in 
Lysianka, but the counting of the votes in polling station 
#96 nonetheless proceeded apace when the polls closed 
at 8:00 PM. Members of the election commission 
manually conducted the count well past midnight, and I 
remained there until the election materials were secured 
and prepared for transport to the territorial election 
commission. The count was orderly and thorough, with 
only one exception. Superfluous marks on a ballot may 
invalidate it, and two members of the election 
commission were counting with pens in their hands. A 
domestic observer and I raised the issue to the
chairperson of the election commission, who then made 
adjustments accordingly. At the conclusion of the count, 
I retrieved a copy of the result protocol, signed and 
sealed by the election commission; of the 2,093 votes 
cast in polling station #96, a resounding 1,477 (or 71%) 
were for Yushchenko, 232 (11%) for the Socialist 
Oleksandr Moroz, and 165 (or 8%) for Yanukovych. 
Results later published by the Central Election 
Committee of Ukraine revealed that, out of the 108,940 
votes cast in election district 199, 65,426 (60%) were 
for Yushchenko, 16,940 (16%) for Yanukovych, and 
14,716 (14%) for Moroz. After winning 76% of the 
vote in district 199 in the invalidated second round on 
November 21, Yushchenko went on to win 85% there in 
the repeat run-off on December 26. Indeed, at the turn 
of 2005, district 199 and the entire Cherkasy oblast had 
unequivocally become Yushchenko country.
Second Round: Transcarpathia
Whereas the regions indicated in Yushchenko's 
slogan “Dontes'k + L'viv = Victory” represent two 
relatively homogenous electorates—the former being 
predominantly Russophone Orthodox, the latter largely 
Ukrainophone Greek Catholic—the oblast of 
Transcarpathia is a collage of diverse ethnic, religious, 
and linguistic affiliations. More than seventeen changes 
of statehood over the course of its history have greatly 
influenced the sense of identity in Transcarpathia.18 
Since constituting part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
the region has been a part of Czechoslovakia (1919-38), 
Hungary (1938-44), the USSR (1945-91), and Ukraine 
(1991-present). The oblast is home to more than 
seventy ethnic groups and twelve ethnic minorities, 
among them Russians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Roma 
(Gypsies), and Jews. Ukrainian, Russian, Hungarian, 
and Slovak are commonly spoken in Transcarpathia, 
and Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Orthodox, and 
Baptist are among the most common religious 
affiliations. Identity is extremely open to fluidity in 
Transcarpathia, differentiating it from other western 
oblasts like Ternopil', L'viv, and Ivano-Frankivs'k, 
where the majority of the electorate expresses a 
relatively strong Ukrainian patriotic sentiment. While 
political analysts never doubted a strong win for Viktor 
Yushchenko in these oblasts, they considered 
Transcarpathia, like Cherkasy to some extent, 
something of a “swing state.” This ambivalence, 
however, did not stem from a lack of clarity regarding 
which candidate particular ethnic groups would support, 
but rather from the degree of influence that the political
17. In October 2004, only weeks before the first round, 
Yanukovych had raised pensions and public sector pay in a 
naked campaign appeal to pensioners and civil servants.
18. Judy Batt, “Transcarpathia: Peripheral Region at the 
‘Centre of Europe,'” Regional and Federal Studies 12:2 
(Summer 2002), pp. 155-77.
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and economic party of power in the region, namely, the 
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine-united (SDPU-o), 
would have over the electorate on Election Day.
Transcarpathia is the poorest and least developed 
region in western Ukraine, and with unemployment at 
70%, it was not difficult for a group of Kyiv oligarchs 
with Transcarpathian family connections to take control 
in the region. For close to a decade, the SDPU-o, which 
is closely allied to President Leonid Kuchma, 
considered Transcarpathia a solid home base.19 An 
Uzhhorod resident best described the party's financial 
and political monopoly in the region in this way: “If you 
were for them, you had money in your pocket. If you 
weren't, you got left behind.”20 On April 18, 2003, the 
mayoral elections in the Transcarpathian town of 
Mukachevo proved to be a harbinger of the struggle for 
power that would occur between the SDPU-o and the 
increasingly popular Our Ukraine party during the 2004 
presidential elections. In Mukachevo, independent exit 
polls and voting protocols indicated that the Our 
Ukraine candidate for mayor, Viktor Baloha, had won 
the elections with 57% of the vote over SDPU-o 
candidate Ernest Nusser, who had received 40%. The 
election commission in Mukachevo nonetheless 
announced Nusser the official winner. Observers of the 
mayoral elections noted serious violations during the 
voting: skinhead groups harassed voters and exit poll 
workers, international observers were not allowed to 
enter polling stations, ballots were manipulated, and 
ballot boxes were stolen.21 On May 29, 2004, following 
more than a year of protests and legal appeals from the 
opposition, Nusser resigned. While the events in 
Mukachevo were an indication that the SDPU-o was 
slowly losing its grip in the region, SDPU-o loyalists 
remained determined to prevent Viktor Yushchenko 
from winning in the oblast in the presidential elections.
Between the first and second rounds of the
presidential elections (October 31-November 21, 2004),
19. Much of my knowledge regarding the role of SDPU-o in 
Transcarpathia is rooted in first-hand experience, because in 
2001-2002, I conducted dissertation research among Roma in 
the region. I chose to serve as an election observer in 
Uzhhorod because I felt that, in order to be effective, one had 
to have a grasp of local politics. My sister Zenia Helbig and I 
worked as a two-person observer team, whose task was to 
monitor the larger, more problematic polling stations in central 
Uzhhorod. In both rounds of the elections, I recognized and 
knew many members of the voting commissions as well as the 
voters themselves. Being aware of people's social and 
political positions helped me discern which people to monitor 
more closely than others.
20. Interview with an anonymous voter, Uzhhorod, 
Transcarpathia, November 21, 2004.
21. “Elections Put Democracy, Rule of Law to a Test in
Ukraine,” USA Today, August 14, 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-08-14-ukraine- 
elections_x.htm.
twenty school directors in Uzhhorod, Transcarpathia, 
were removed from their posts. They had received 
significant bribes to influence the vote in polling 
stations set up in their respective schools and were 
instructed to choose trusted teachers to comprise local 
polling station election commissions. These teachers 
were to work in a way that would ensure a final vote 
count that favored the pro-government candidate, Viktor 
Yanukovych.22 Such hand-picked commissions were 
meant to ensure that pro-government supporters 
outnumbered opposition supporters at the local level. It 
was ultimately Viktor Yushchenko, however, who won 
the first round of the elections in the Transcarpathia 
oblast with 47% of the vote; the school directors were 
presumably punished for his victory.
Despite numerous complaints lodged by local and 
international observers over the imbalance of 
representative power in election commissions, the 
structure of the commissions remained the same in the 
second round of elections. In the first round, for 
example, I had served as an international observer in 
polling station #7, among the largest of the 41 polling 
districts in Uzhhorod's territorial election district 70. 
The head of the polling station election commission 
there, Maria Zhebliak, had kept 1,739 unused ballots in 
an open, unguarded safe out of the view of observers 
and other commission members. The ballots were 
placed beneath a desk in a side room where Ms. 
Zhebliak and her assistant claimed they were “doing 
paperwork.” In response, representatives from Our 
Ukraine immediately filed a criminal complaint in the 
local courts, at which time we counted the unused 
ballots. They were all accounted for, but during the 
eventual vote count, many cast ballots were deemed 
invalid (nediisni) because they had been stamped with 
two seals from the election commission rather than one. 
(Had 10% of the ballots been deemed nediisni, the 
voting in polling station #7 would have been 
invalidated, nullifying Viktor Yushchenko's 68% win in 
the polling station.) Despite these suspicious incidents 
in the first round, the courts dismissed the criminal 
complaint against Ms. Zhebliak filed by Our Ukraine 
and signed by local observers and myself. In fact, she 
was reappointed chairperson of the election commission 
for polling station #7 in the second round of the 
presidential elections on November 21, 2004.23
22. Interview with an anonymous member of the election 
commission at polling station #6, Uzhhorod, Transcarpathia, 
November, 21, 2004.
23. On November 21, my sister Zenia served as an election 
observer in Ms. Zhebliak's polling station. Commission 
members forbade Zenia, along with other local observers, to 
walk freely throughout the station. Zenia filed a complaint 
against Ms. Zhebliak for allowing commission members to 
commit this violation, among others. Unfortunately, even 
after the rights of the observers had been “reinstated” at the
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Our Ukraine representatives who served on electoral 
commissions were harassed and threatened even more 
during the second round of elections than they had been 
during the first. For example, the former head of the 
electoral commission in polling station #6, an Our 
Ukraine supporter, was pressured to resign; a 
Yanukovych representative replaced her. At the same 
polling station, pro-Yanukovych commission members 
relegated the greatly outnumbered Our Ukraine 
representatives to the post of observers and prohibited 
them from distributing ballots to voters.
During the second round on November 21, one 
figure who immediately caught my eye in Uzhhorod's 
polling station #7 was a school director, who was 
lingering around the voting premises. When I asked 
him to leave the polling station because he had already 
voted and had no reason to stay since he was not a 
member of the electoral commission, he replied that he 
ran the school where the voting was taking place and 
had to stay to ensure that voters did not damage school 
property. The school director neglected to admit, 
however, that he was an elected SDPU-o official on the 
city council and by law could not be present on the 
premises at all. Nonetheless, he greeted voters at the 
door and, with a firm handshake, a smile, or stern look, 
“reminded” them for whom to vote. Days before he had 
instructed the schoolchildren in a homework assignment 
to write an essay about the candidate for whom their 
parents would vote. At a dinner on the eve of the 
elections, Vera Madiar-Novak, a music professor whose 
children attend the particular school in question, told me 
that the director had actively encouraged parents to vote 
for Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential elections.24 
The director hinted that such a vote would benefit their 
children's “progress” in the school.
Transcarpathia's university students were coerced as 
well. Students from Uzhhorod informed us that they 
were forced to vote by absentee ballot in polling stations 
outside the city. Before they cast their ballots, the 
students had to hold them in such a way that the 
Yanukovych representative lingering near the ballot 
boxes could ensure that they voted for the “correct” 
candidate. Students who did not cooperate were 
expelled, fined, or given low marks.
Particular segments of the voting public were 
especially vulnerable to manipulation, and Roma voters 
are among the poorest and most marginalized members 
of Transcarpathian society. Roma activists Aladar 
Adam and Evhenija Navrotska reported that, throughout
polling station, the commission's boldness intimidated local 
observers to the point that none felt comfortable monitoring 
the commission members closely.
24. Personal communication, Vera Madiar-Novak, Uzhhorod,
Transcarpathia.
the region, Roma passports were taken away for 
“routine inspection” a few days prior to both the first 
and second round of elections.25 Third parties submitted 
these documents to obtain absentee ballots, which were 
then used to cast votes for Viktor Yanukovych. Many 
Roma in rural settings were physically harassed and 
transported to polling stations where they received 
instructions to cast pre-checked ballots in favor of 
Yanukovych. In a village a few kilometers from 
Uzhhorod, a local official attempted to accompany 
Roma voters into the voting booths, stating that they 
were illiterate and that he had to help them read the 
ballot.
Perhaps the most elaborate violation scheme 
uncovered in Uzhhorod was a vote-rigging system 
known as a “carousel.” An operative outside the polling 
station paid a voter to bring out a blank ballot. The 
operative marked the ballot for a particular candidate 
and gave it to the next voter, who then dropped it in the 
ballot box and brought back a blank ballot. Such a 
system was very difficult to identify; in fact, an 
investigation only began when a voter mistook an 
observer as the contact person for a local “carousel.”
As in Cherkasy, the fear factor was among the more 
effective forces utilized by pro-government factions 
during the pre-electoral campaign and during both 
rounds of the presidential elections. One voter called 
our observer team “the Ukrainian people's only hope,” 
and an election commission member from the Our 
Ukraine party pointed out that the presence of 
international figures in the polling stations was a form 
of moral support. Seeing international observers gave 
her the confidence to stand up against the commission 
members who were breaking election laws.
Working together, my sister Zenia Helbig and I 
noticed that at numerous polling stations, however, local 
election observers did not report election violations. 
When I asked one observer to sign a violation report 
form as a witness, he declined, stating, “Tomorrow you 
will leave, but I have to live here.” Such a statement 
implies that the observer, an Our Ukraine supporter, did 
not believe that Viktor Yushchenko would be 
pronounced the winner of the second round of elections. 
The statement also indicates that the observer had been 
intimidated or feared harassment by those in power. 
Among the observers who refused to sign my violation 
report forms, however, were also those who had been 
paid to look the other way.
Despite the violations my sister and I witnessed as 
election observers in Uzhhorod, and despite the 
stronghold that the SDPU-o had had in the region in the 
past, Viktor Yushchenko won the second round of the
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elections in Transcarpathia with 55% of the vote. In the 
repeat run-off on December 26, 2004, he won the region 
with a solid 67% of the vote. His margin of victory 
nationwide was approximately 3 million votes.
Conclusion
When a record number of more than 12,000 
international observers walked into polling stations 
across Ukraine on the morning of December 26, 2004, 
they encountered an electoral atmosphere marked by 
significant improvement. After the Ukrainian Supreme 
Court's dramatic ruling on December 3 that invalidated 
the November 21 poll, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme 
Council, Ukraine's Parliament) implemented a number 
of measures designed to curb future falsification and 
fraud. Several members of the Ukrainian Central 
Election Commission were replaced, for example, and 
territorial and polling station election commissions were 
restructured as well. Polling station commissions were 
no longer comprised of thirty or more members; rather, 
each election commission had twelve members with 
equal representation afforded to both candidates. 
Crucial modifications were also made to numerous 
election laws. Because absentee ballots were so 
extensively abused in the first and second rounds, the 
percentage of absentee ballots allowed in the December 
26 run-off was reduced from 4% to 0.5% of all ballots 
cast. All ballots were also imprinted with the 
registration number of their respective polling stations 
in order to ensure that voters only cast ballots in the 
stations where they were registered. New regulations 
also stated that the results in a particular polling station 
could be annulled if observers, journalists, or 
commission members were not allowed entrance into 
the polling station or prevented from attending 
commission meetings or the vote count.
The efforts of international and domestic observers 
were instrumental in bringing world opinion to bear on 
the Ukrainian presidential elections and highlighting the 
electoral violations that prompted the Verkhovna Rada 
to adopt these changes. But it was the tremendous will 
of the people of Ukraine—who came together from all 
regions of the country to defend the integrity of their 
vote in a peaceful “Orange Revolution”—that ultimately 
made the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections a true 
victory for democracy.
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